We study the problem of computing an -Nash equilibrium in repeated games. Earlier work by Borgs et al. [2010] suggests that this problem is intractable. We show that if we make a slight change to their model-modeling the players as polynomial-time Turing machines that maintain state (rather than stateless polynomial-time Turing machines)-and make some standard cryptographic hardness assumptions (the existence of public-key encryption), the problem can actually be solved in polynomial time.
INTRODUCTION
The complexity of finding a Nash equilibrium (NE) is a fundamental question at the interface of game theory and computer science. A celebrated sequence of results showed that the complexity of finding a NE in a normal-form game is PPAD-complete [3, 5] , even for 2-player games. Less restrictive concepts, such as -NE for an inverse-polynomial , are just as hard [4] . This suggests that these problems are computationally intractable.
There was some hope that the situation would be better in infinitely-repeated games. The Folk Theorem (see [19] for a review) informally states that in an infinitely-repeated game G, for any payoff profile that is individually rational, in that all players get more than 1 their minimax payoff (the highest payoff that a player can guarantee himself, no matter what Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from permissions@acm.org. the other players do) and is the outcome of some correlated strategy in G, there is a Nash equilibrium of G with this payoff profile. With such a large set of equilibria, the hope was that finding one would be less difficult. Indeed, Littman and Stone [17] showed that these ideas can be used to design an algorithm for finding a NE in a two-player repeated game.
Borgs et al. [2] (BC+ from now on) proved some results suggesting that, for more than two players, even in infinitelyrepeated games it would be difficult to find a NE. Specifically, they showed that, under certain assumptions, the problem of finding a NE (or even an -NE for an inversepolynomial ) in an infinitely repeated game with three or more players where there is a discount factor bounded away from 1 by an inverse polynomial is also PPAD-hard. They prove this by showing that, given an arbitrary normal-form game G with c ≥ 2 players, there is a game G with c + 1 players such that finding an /8c-NE for the repeated game based on G is equivalent to finding an -NE for G.
While their proof is indeed correct, in this paper, we challenge their conclusion. Not surprisingly, we do this by changing their assumptions in what we argue are natural ways. Like BC+, we assume that players are resource bounded. 2 Formally, we view players as probabilistic 3 polynomial-time Turing machines (PPT TMs). We differ from BC+ in two key respects. First, BC+ implicitly assume that players have no memory: they cannot remember computation from earlier rounds. By way of contrast, we allow players to have a bounded (polynomial) amount of memory. This allows players to remember the results of a few coin tosses from earlier rounds, and means that we can use some cryptography (making some standard cryptographic assumptions) to try to coordinate the players. We stress that this coordination happens in the process of the game play, not through communication. That is, there are no side channels; the only form of "communication" is by making moves in the game. We call such TMs stateful, and the BC+ TMs stateless. Second, since we restrict to (probabilistic) polynomialtime players, we restrict the deviations that can be made in equilibrium to those that can be computed by such players; BC+ allow arbitrary deviations. Without this extra restriction, there is no real difference between stateful TMs and stateless TMs in our setting (since a player with unbounded computational power can recreate the necessary state). With these assumptions (and the remaining assumptions of the BC+ model), we show that in fact an -NE in an infinitelyrepeated game can be found in polynomial time.
Roughly speaking, the -NE can be described as proceeding in three stages. In the first stage, the players play a sequence of predefined actions repeatedly. If some player deviates from the sequence, the second stage begins, in which the other players use their actions to secretly exchange a random seed, through the use of public-key encryption. In the third stage, the players use a correlated minimax strategy to punish the deviator forever. To achieve this correlation, the players use the secret random seed as the seed of a pseudorandom function, and use the outputs of the pseudorandom function as the source of randomness for the correlated strategy. Since the existence of public-key encryption implies the existence of pseudorandom functions, the only cryptographic assumption needed is the existence of publickey encryptions-one of the most basic cryptographic hardness assumptions.
Related work
The idea of considering resource-bounded agents has a long history in game theory. It is known, for example, that cooperation is a NE of finitely-repeated prisoner's dilemma with resource-bounded players (see, e.g., [18, 22, 20] ). The idea of using the structure of the game as a means of correlation is used by Lehrer [16] to show an equivalence between NE and correlated equilbrium in certain repeated games with nonstandard information structures. The use of cryptography in game theory goes back to Urbano and Vila [24, 23] , who also used it to do coordination between players. More recently, it has been used by, for example, Dodis, Halevi, and Rabin [7] .
The application of cryptography perhaps most closely related to ours is by Gossner [12] , who uses cryptographic techniques to show how any payoff profile that is above the players' correlated minimax value can be achieved in a NE of a repeated game with public communication played by computationally bounded players. In [13] , Gossner uses a strategy similar to the one that we use to prove that, even without communication, the same result holds. Gossner's results apply only to infinitely-repeated games with 3 players and no discounting; he claims that his results do not hold for games with discounting. Gossner does not discuss the complexity of finding a strategy of the type that he shows exists.
Recently, Andersen and Conitzer [1] described an algorithm for finding NE in repeated games with more than two players with high probability in uniform games. However, this algorithm is not guaranteed to work for all games, and uses the limit of means as its payoff criterion, and not discounting.
PRELIMINARIES

Infinitely repeated games
We define a game G as a triple ([c] , A, u), where [c] = {1, . . . , c} is the set of players, Ai is the set of possible actions for player i, A = A1 × . . . × Ac is the set of action profiles, and u : A → R c is the utility function ( ui( a) is the utility of player i). A (mixed) strategy σi for player i is a probability distribution over Ai, that is, an element of ∆(Ai) (where, as usual, we denote by ∆(X) the set of probability distributions over the set X). We use the standard notation x−i to denote vector x with its ith element removed, and (x , x−i) to denote x with its ith element replaced by x . Definition 2.1. (Nash Equilibrium) σ = (σ1, ..., σc) is an -NE of G if, for all players i ∈ [c] and all actions a i ∈ Ai,
A correlated strategy of a game G is an element σ ∈ ∆(A). It is a correlated equilibrium if, for all players i, they have no temptation to play a different action, given that the action profile was chosen according to σ. That is, for all players i for all ai ∈ Ai such that σi(ai) > 0,
Player i's minimax value in a game G is the highest payoff i can guarantee himself if the other players are trying to push his payoff as low as possible. We call the strategy i plays in this case a minimax strategy for i; the strategy that the other players use is i's (correlated) punishment strategy. (Of course, there could be more than one minimax strategy or punishment strategy for player i.) Note that a correlated punishment strategy can be computed using linear programming.
Simplifying assumption: We normalize all payoffs so that each player's minimax value is 0. Since, in an equilibrium, all players get at least their minimax value, this guarantees that all players get at least 0 in a NE. We also assume that each player has at least two actions in G. (This allows us to use the actions played in the infinitely-repeated game based on G to encode bit strings.) This assumption is without loss of generality-we can essentially ignore players for whom it does not hold.
Given a normal-form game G, we define the repeated game G t (δ) as the game in which G is played repeatedly t times (in this context, G is called the stage game) and 1 − δ is the discount factor (see below). Let G ∞ (δ) be the game where G is played infinitely many times. An infinite history h in this game is an infinite sequence a 0 , a 1 , . . . of actions profiles. Intuitively, we can think of a t as the action profile played in the t th stage game. We often omit the δ in G ∞ (δ) if it is not relevant to the discussion. Like BC+, we assume that G ∞ is fully observable, in the sense that, after each stage game, the players observe exactly what actions the other players played.
Since we consider computationally-bounded players, we take a player's strategy in G ∞ to be a (possibly probabilistic) Turing machine (TM), which outputs at each round an action to be played, based on its internal memory and the history of play so far. (The TMs considered in BC+ did not have internal memory.) We consider only TMs that at round t use polynomial in nt many steps to compute the next action, where n is the maximum number of actions a player has in G. Thus, n is a measure of the size of G. 4 Denote by Mi the TM used by player i, and let M = (M1, . . . , Mc).
Note that a profile M induces a distribution ρ M on infinite histories of play. Let ρ t M denote the induced distribution on H t , the set of histories of length t. (If t = 0, we take H 0 to consist of the unique history of length 0, namely .) Player i's utility if M is played, denoted pi( M ), is defined as follows:
Thus, the discount factor is 1 − δ. Note that the initial δ is a normalization factor. It guarantees that if ui( a) ∈ [b1, b2] for all joint actions a in G, then i's utility is in [b1, b2], no matter which TM profile M is played.
We are now ready to define the notion of equilibrium we use. Intuitively, as we model players as polynomial-time TMs, we consider a profile of TMs an equilibrium in a game if there is no player and no other polynomial-time TM that gives that player a higher expected payoff (or up to an for an -NE).
Since we consider (probabilistic) TMs that run in polynomial time in the size of the game, we cannot consider a single game. For any fixed game, running in polynomial time in the size of the game is meaningless. Instead, we need to consider a sequence of games. This leads to the following definition.
Definition 2.3. An infinite sequence of strategy profiles 
where p k i is the payoff of player i in game G ∞ k .
We note that the equilibrium definition we use considers only deviations that can be implemented by polynomial-time TMs. This is different from both the usual definition of NE and from the definition used by BC+, who allow arbitrary deviations. The need to define polynomial-time deviation is the reason for considering sequences of games instead of a single game. There are other reasonable ways of capturing polynomial-time adversaries. As will be seen from our proof, our approach is quite robust, so our results should hold for any reasonable definition.
Cryptographic definitions
For a probabilistic algorithm A and an infinite bit string r, A(x; r) denotes the output of A running on input x with randomness r; A(x) denotes the distribution on outputs of A induced by considering A(x; r), where r is chosen uniformly at random. A function : N → [0, 1] is negligible if, for every constant c ∈ N, (k) < k −c for sufficiently large k.
In this section, when we mention a PPT algorithm, we mean a non-uniform PPT algorithm and, specifically, an algorithm that, in addition to its regular input, gets for every input length an additional input (of polynomial length) that is viewed as advice . It is common to assume that the cryptographic building blocks we define next and use in our constructions are secure against non-uniform PPT algorithms.
Computational Indistinguishability
Definition 2.4. A probability ensemble is a sequence X = {Xn} n∈N of random variables indexed by N. (Typically, in an ensemble X = {Xn} n∈N , the domain of Xn consists of strings of length n.)
We now recall the definition of computational indistinguishability [11] .
Definition 2.5. Two probability ensembles {Xn} n∈N , {Yn} n∈N are computationally indistinguishable if, for all PPT algorithms D, there exists a negligible function such that, for all n ∈ N,
To explain the Pr in the last line, recall that Xn and Yn are random variables. Although we write D(1 n , Xn), D is a randomized algorithm, so what D(1 n , Xn) returns depends on the outcome of random coin tosses. To be a little more formal, we should write D(1 n , Xn, r), where r is an infinitely long random bit strong (of which D will only use a finite initial prefix). More formally, taking Pr to be the uniform distribution on bit-strings and over the value of Xn (or Yn), we want
We similarly abuse notation elsewhere in writing Pr.
We often call a PPT algorithm that is supposed to distinguish between two probability ensembles a distinguisher.
Pseudorandom Functions
Definition 2.6. A function ensemble is a sequence F = {Fn} n∈N of random variables such that the range of Fn is the set of functions mapping n-bit strings to n-bit strings. The uniform function ensemble, denoted H = {Hn} n∈N , has Hn uniformly distributed over the set of all functions mapping n-bit strings to n-bit strings.
We have the same notion of computational indistinguishablity for function ensembles as we had for probability ensembles, only that the distinguisher is now an oracle machine, meaning that it can query the value of the function at any point with one computation step, although it does not have the full description of the function. (See [9] for a detailed description.)
We now define pseudorandom functions (see [10] ). Intuitively, this is a family of functions indexed by a seed, such that it is hard to distinguish a random member of the family from a truly randomly selected function. Definition 2.7. A pseudorandom function ensemble (PRF) is a set {fs : {0, 1} |s| → {0, 1} |s| } s∈{0,1} * such that the following conditions hold:
• (easy to compute) fs(x) can be computed by a PPT algorithm that is given s and x;
• (pseudorandom) the function ensemble F = {Fn} n∈N , where Fn is uniformly distributed over the multiset {fs} s∈{0,1} n , is computationally indistinguishable from H.
We use the standard cryptographic assumption that a family of PRFs exists; this assumption is implied by the existence of one-way functions [14, 10] . We actually require the use of a seemingly stronger notion of a PRF, which requires that an attacker getting access to polynomially many instances of a PRF (i.e., fs for polynomially many values of s) still cannot distinguish them from polynomially many truly random functions. Nevertheless, as we show in Appendix A, it follows using a standard "hybrid" argument that any PRF satisfies also this stronger "multi-instance" security notion.
Public-key Encryption Schemes
We now define public-key encryption schemes. Such a scheme has two keys. The first is public and used for encrypting messages (using a randomized algorithm). The second is secret and used for decrypting. The keys are generated in such a way that the probability that a decrypted message is equal to the encrypted message is equal to 1. The key generation algorithm takes as input a "security parameter" k that is used to determine the security of the protocols (inuitively, no polynomial-time attacker should be able to "break" the security of the protocol except possibly with a probability that is a negligible function of k).
We now recall the formal definitions of public-key encryption schemes [6, 21, 11] .
Definition 2.8. Given a polynomial l, an l-bit publickey encryption scheme is a triple Π = (Gen, Enc, Dec) of PPT algorithms where (a) Gen takes a security parameter 1 k as input and returns a (public key, private key) pair; (b) Enc takes a public key pk and a message m in a message space {0, 1} l(k) as input and returns a ciphertext Enc pk (m); (c) Dec is a deterministic algorithm that takes a secret key sk and a ciphertext C as input and outputs m = Dec sk (C), and (d)
We next define a security notion for public-key encryption. Such a security notion considers an adversary that is characterized by two PPT algorithms, A1 and A2. Intuitively, A1 gets as input a public key that is part of a (public key, secret key) pair randomly generated by Gen, together with a security parameter k. A1 then outputs two messages in {0, 1} k (intuitively, messages it can distinguish), and some side information that it passes to A2 (intuitively, this is information that A2 needs, such as the messages chosen; An example of how this is used can be seen in Appendix B). A2 gets as input the encryption of one of those messages and the side information passed on by A1. A2 must output which of the two messages m0 and m1 the encrypted message is the encryption of (where an output of b ∈ {0, 1} indicates that it is m b ). Since A1 and A2 are PPT algorithms, the output of A2 can be viewed as a probability distribution over {0, 1}. The scheme is secure if the two ensembles (i.e., the one generated by this process where the encryption of m0 is always given to A2, and the one where the encryption of m1 is always given to A2) are indistinguishable. More formally: Definition 2.9 (Public-key security). An l-bit public-key encryption scheme Π = (Gen, Enc, Dec) is secure if, for every probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A = (A1, A2), the ensembles {IND 
Intuitively, the ← above functions as an assignment statement, but it is not quite that, since the various algorithms are actually PPT algorithms, so their output is randomized. k, r1, r2, r3, r4) , we view r1, r2, r3, and r4 as the random bitstrings that serve as the second arguments of Gen, A1, Enc pk , and A2, respectively. Once we add these arguments (considering, e.g., Gen(1 k , r1) and A1(1 k , pk, r2) rather than Gen(1 k ) and A1(1 k , pk)) these algorithms become deterministic, and ← can indeed be viewed as an assignment statement.
We assume a secure public-key encryption scheme exists. We actually require a seemingly stronger notion of "multiinstance" security, where an attacker gets to see encryptions of multiple messages, each of which is encrypted using multiple keys. 
In this definition, there are polynomially many messages being encrypted, and each message is encrypted a polynomial number of times, using a different key each time. Other than that, the process is similar to the standard definition of security. As we show in Appendix B, any secure encryption scheme is also multi-message multi-key secure.
THE COMPLEXITY OF FINDING -NE IN REPEATED GAMES PLAYED BY STATEFUL MACHINES
Our goal is to show that an -NE in infinitely-repeated games can be computed in polynomial time.
Preliminaries
Definition 3.1. Let G a,b,c,n be the set of all games with c players, at most n actions per player, integral payoffs 5 , maximum payoff a, and minimum payoff b.
Note that by our assumption that the minimax payoff is 0 for all players, we can assume a ≥ 0, b ≤ 0, and a − b > 0 (otherwise a = b = 0, which makes the game uninteresting). We start by showing that, given a correlated strategy σ in a game G, players can get an average payoff that is arbitrarily close to their payoff in σ by playing a fixed sequence of action profiles repeatedly.
Lemma 3.2. For all a, b, c, all polynomials q, all n, all games G ∈ G a,b,c,n , and all correlated strategies σ in G, if the expected payoff vector of playing σ is p then there exists a sequence sq of length w(n), where w(n) = ((a − b)q(n) + 1)n c , such that player i's average payoff in sq is at least pi − 1/q(n).
Proof. Given σ, we create sq the obvious way: by playing each action in proportion to the probability σ( a). More precisely, let r = a − b, and define w(n) = (rq(n) + 1)n c , as in the statement of the lemma. We create a sequence sq by playing each action profile a w(n)σ( a) times, in some fixed order. Notice that the length of this sequence is between w(n) − n c and w(n). The average payoff player i gets in sq is
.
5 Our result also hold for rational payoffs except then the size of the game needs to take into account the bits needed to represent the payoffs Lemma 3.3. For all a, b, c, all polynomials q and w, all G ∈ G a,b,c,n , and all sequences sq of length w(n), if the average payoff vector of playing sq is p, then for all δ ≤ 1/f (n), where f (n) = (a−b)w(n)q(n), if sq is played infinitely often, player i's payoff in G ∞ (δ) is at least pi − 1/q(n).
Proof. Suppose that sq = (a0, . . . , a w(n)−1 ), and let vi be i's payoff from sq
We want to bound the loss from the second part of the sum. Notice that this is a discounted sum of a sequence whose average payoff is 0. Call this sequence sq . Observe that, because of the discounting, in the worst case, i gets all of his negative payoff in the first round of sq and all his positive payoffs in the last round. Thus, we can bound the discounted average payoff by analyzing this case. Let the sum of i's negative payoffs in sq be Pneg, which means that the sum of i's positive payoffs must be −Pneg. Let r = a − b, let v i = min a∈A (ui( a) − pi) ≥ −r, and let f (n) = rw(n)q(n), as in the statement of the lemma. So, if δ ≤ 1/f (n), player i s average discounted payoff in the game is at least
The next lemma shows that, for every inverse polynomial, if we "cut off" the game after some appropriately large polynomial p number of rounds (and compute the discounted utility for the finitely repeated game considering only p(n) repetitions), each player's utility in the finitely repeated game is negligibly close to his utility in the infinitely repeated game-that is, the finitely repeated game is a "good" approximation of the infinitely repeated game. 
An -NE
Let sq = (s1, s2 . . . , sm) be a sequence of action profiles such that the average payoff (with no discounting) of player i from playing sq repeatedly is pi. Let a 0 i , a 1 i ∈ Ai be two actions of player i. A player can broadcast an m-bit string by using these two actions for m rounds (treating a 0 as 0 and a 1 as 1). Let (Gen, Enc, Dec) be a multi-message multi-key secure l-bit public-key encryption scheme where, if the security parameter is k, the length of an encrypted message is z(k) for some polynomial z. Fix a polynomial-time pseudorandom function ensemble {PS s : s ∈ {0, 1} * }. For a game G such that |G| = n, consider the following strategy σ NE for player i in G ∞ (δ):
1. Play according to sq (with wraparound) as long as sq was played in the previous round.
2. After detecting a deviation by player j = i in round t0 (note that here we are using the assumption that players can observe the action profile played in the previous stage):
(a) Generate a pair (pki, ski) using Gen(1 n ). Use the next l(n) rounds to broadcast pki, as discussed above.
(b) If i = j + 1 (with wraparound), player i does the following:
• i records pk j for all players j / ∈ {i, j} (here we are using the fact that our TMs have memory);
• i generates a random n-bit seed seed ; • for each player j / ∈ {i, j}, i computes m = Enc pk j (seed ), and uses the next (c − 2)z(n) rounds to communicate these strings to the players other than i and j (in some predefined order).
(c) If i = j + 1, player i does the following:
• i records the actions played by j + 1 at time slots designated for i to retrieve Enc P k i (seed ); • i decrypts to obtain seed , using Dec and ski.
3. At a round t after the communication phase ends, the players other than j compute PS seed (t) and use it to determine which action profile to play according to the distribution defined by a fixed (correlated) punishment strategy against j.
Note that if the players other than j had played a punishment strategy against j, then j would get his minimax payoff of 0. What the players other than j are actually doing is playing an approximation to a punishment strategy in two senses: first they are using a psuedorandom function to generate the randomness, which means that they are not quite playing according to the actual punishment strategy. Also, j might be able to guess which pure strategy profile they are actually playing at each round, and so do better than his minimax value. As we now show, j's expected gain during the punishment phase is negligible. For all a, b, c, all polynomials t and f , all  n, and all games G ∈ G a,b,c ,n , in G ∞ (1/f (n)), if the players other than j play σ NE −j , then if j deviates at round t(n), j's expected payoff during the punishment phase is negligible.
Proof. Since we want to show j's expected payoff during the punishment phase (phase (3) only) is negligible, it suffices to consider only polynomially many rounds of playing phase (3) (more precisely, at most nf (n) rounds); by Lemma 3.4, any payoff beyond then is guaranteed to be negligible due to the discounting.
We construct three variants of the strategy σ NE −j , that vary in phases (2) and (3). We can think of these variants as interpolating between the strategy above and the use of true randomness. (These variants assume an oracle that provides appropriate information; these variants are used only to make the claims precise.) H1 In phase (2), the punishing players send their public keys to j + 1. For each player j not being punished, player j +1 then encrypts the seed 0 using (j )'s public key, and then sends the encrypted key to j . In phase (3), the punishing players get the output of a truly random function (from an oracle), and use it to play the true punishment strategy. (In this case, phase (2) can be eliminated.)
H2 In phase (2), the punishing players send their public keys to j + 1. For each player j not being punished, player j + 1 encrypts the seed 0 using (j )'s public key, and then sends the encrypted key to j . In phase (3), the punishing players get a joint random seed seed (from an oracle) and use the outputs of PS seed to decide which strategy profile to play in each round.
(Again, in this case, phase (2) can be eliminated.)
H3 In phase (2), the punishing players send their public keys to j + 1. Player j + 1 chooses a random seed seed and, for each player j not being punished, j + 1 encrypts seed using (j )'s public key, and then sends the encrypted key to j . In phase (3), the punishing players use the outputs of PS seed to decide which strategy profile to play in each round.
It is obvious that in H1, j's expected payoff is negligible. (Actually, there is a slight subtlety here. As we observed above, using linear programming, we can compute a strategy that gives the correlated minimax, which gives j an expected payoff of 0. To actually implement this correlated minimax, the players need to sample according to the minimax distribution. They cannot necessarily do this exactly (for example, 1/3 can't be computed exactly using random bits). However, given n, the distribution can be discretized to the closest rational number of the form m/2 n using at most n random bits. Using such a discretized distribution, the players other than j can ensure that j gets only a negligible payoff.)
We now claim that in H2, j's expected payoff during the punishment phase is negligible. Assume for contradiction that a player playing H2 has a non-negligible payoff µ(n) for all n (i.e., there exists some polynomial g(·) such that µ(n) ≥ 1/g(n) for infinitely many n.). Let
We claim that if j's expected payoff is non-negligible, then we can distinguish h(n) instances of the PRF {P Ss : s ∈ {0, 1} n } with independently generated random seeds, from h(n) independent truly random functions, contradicting the multi-instance security of the PRF P S.
More precisely, we construct a distinguisher D that, given 1 n and oracle access to a set of functions f 1 , f 2 , . . . , f h(n) , proceeds as follows. It simulates H2 (it gets the description of the machines to play as its non-uniform advice) h(n) times where in iteration i , it uses the function f i as the randomization source of the correlated punishment strategy. D then computes the average payoff of player j in the h(n) runs, and outputs 1 if this average exceeds µ(n)/2. Note that if the functions f 1 , f 2 , . . . , f h(n) are truly independent random functions, then D perfectly simulates H1 and thus, in each iteration i , the expected payoff of player j (during the punishment phase) is negligible. On the other hand, if the functions f 1 , f 2 , . . . , f h(n) are h(n) independent randomly chosen instances of the PRF {P Ss : s ∈ {0, 1} n }, then D perfectly simulates H2, and thus, in each iteration i , the expected payoff of player j (during the punishment phase) is at least µ(n).
By Hoeffding's inequality [15] , given m random variables X1, . . . , Xm all of which take on values in an interval of size c , p(|X−E(X)| ≥ r) ≤ 2 exp(− 2mr 2 c 2 ) . Since, in this setting, the range of the random variables is an interval of size a − b, the probability that D outputs 1 when the function are truly independent is at most 2/e n , while the probability that D outputs 1 when the functions are independent randomly chosen instances of the PRF {P Ss : s ∈ {0, 1} n } is at least 1 − 2/e n . This, in turn, means that the difference between them is not negligible, which is a contradiction. Thus, j's expected payoff in H2 must be negligible.
We now claim that in H3, player j's expected payoff during the punishment phase is also negligible. Indeed, if j can get a non-negligible payoff, then we can break the multimessage multi-key secure encryption scheme.
Again, assume for contradiction that the punished player's expected payoff in the punishment phase is a non-negligible function µ(n) for all n. We can build a distinguisher A = (A1, A2) (which also gets the description of the machines to play as its non-uniform advice) to distinguish {IND-MULT Π 0 (A, n, h, c)}n and {IND-MULT Π 1 (A, n, h, c)}n (where we abuse notation and identify c with the constant polynomial that always returns c). Given n, A1 randomly selects h(n) messages r1, . . . , r h(n) and outputs (0, . . . , 0, r1, . . . , r h(n) , (pk1, . . . , pkc)). A2 splits its input into pieces. The first piece contains the first c encryptions in C (i.e., the c encryptions of the first message chosen, according to the c different encryption functions), the second the next c encryptions and so on. Notice that each piece consists of c different encryptions of the same message in both cases. It can also simulate phase (1) by following the strategy for t rounds. It then uses each piece, along with the public keys, to simulate the communication in phase (2) . For piece j it uses rj as the seed of the PRF in phase (3). It repeats this experiment for all the different pieces of the input, for a total of h(n) times, and outputs 1 if the punished player's average payoff over all experiments using its strategy is more than µ(n)/2.
Note that if b = 1, player j faces H3 (i.e., the distributions over runs when b = 1 is identical to the distribution over runs with H3, since in both cases the seed is chosen at random and the corresponding messages are selected the same way), so player j's expected payoff in the punishment phase is µ(n). Thus, by Hoeffding's inequality the probability that player j's average payoff in the punishment phase is more then µ(n)/2 is 1 − 2/e n , so A2 outputs 1 with that probability in the case b = 1. On the other hand, if b = 0, then this is just H2. We know player j's expected payoff in the punishment phase in each experiment is no more than negligible in H2, so the probability that the average payoff is more than µ(n)/2 after h(n) rounds, is negligible. This means that there is a non-negligible difference between the probability A outputs 1 when b = 1 and when b = 0, which contradicts the assumption that the encryption scheme is multi-message multi-key secure public key secure. Thus, the gain in H3 must be negligible.
H3 is exactly the game that the punished player faces; thus, this shows he can't hope to gain more than a negligible payoff in expectation.
We can now state and prove our main theorem, which says that σ NE is an -NE for all inverse polynomials if δ is a small enough inverse polynomial.
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Theorem 3.6. For all a, b, c, and all polynomials q, there is a polynomial f and a polynomial-time algorithm that, for all sequences G1, G2, . . . of games with Gj ∈ G a,b,c,j and for all inverse polynomials δ ≤ 1/f , the sequence of outputs of the algorithm given the sequence G1, G2, . . . of inputs is a
, the first step of the algorithm is to find a correlated equilibrium σ of G n . This can be done in polynomial time using linear programming. Since the minimax value of the game is 0 for all players, all players have an expected utility of at least 0 using σ. Let r = a − b. By Lemma 3.2, we can construct a sequence sq of length w(n) = (3rnq(n) + 1)n c that has an average payoff for each player that is at most 1/3q(n) less than his payoff using σ. By Lemma 3.3, it follows that by setting the discount factor δ < 1/f (n), where f (n) = 3rw(n)q(n), the loss due to discounting is also at most 1/3q(n). We can also find a punishment strategy against each player in polynomial time, using linear programming.
We can now just take σ * n to be the strategy σ N E described earlier that uses the sequence sq, the algorithm computed, and the punishment strategies. Let m(n) be the length of phase (2) . (Note that m(n) is a polynomial that depends only on the choice of encryption scheme-that is, it depends on l, where an l-bit public-key encryption scheme is used, and on z, where z(k) is the length of encrypted messages.) Let
Notice that f is independent of the actual game as required.
We now show that σ * 1 , . . . as defined above is a (1/q)-NE. If in game G n a player follows σ * n , he gets at least −2/3q(n). Suppose that player j defects at round t; that is, that he plays according to σ * n until round t, and then defects. By Lemma 3.4 if t > n δ(n)
, then any gain from defection is negligible, so there exists some n1 such that, for all n > n1, a defection in round t cannot result in the player gaining more than
. If player j defects at round t ≤ n δ(n)
, he gets at most a for the duration of phase (2) , which is at most m(n) rounds, and then, by Lemma 3.5, gains only a negligible amount, say neg (n) (which may depend on the sequence of deviations), in phase (3). Let u n i be the payoff of player i in game G n of the sequence. It suffices to show that
By deleting the common terms from both side, rearranging, and noticing that (1 − δ(n))
We divide both sides of the equation
No matter at what step of the sequence the defection happens, the future expected discounted payoff from that point on is still at least −2/3q(n), as our bound applies for the worst sequence for a player, and we assumed that in equilibrium all players get at least 0. It follows that we need to show δ(n)( m(n) k=0 a(1 − δ(n)) k + neg (n)) − 1 q(n)(1 − δ(n)) t ≤ − 2 3q(n) .
Since neg is negligible for all deviations, it follows that, for all sequences of deviations, there exists n0 such that neg (n) < 1 for all n ≥ n0. For n ≥ n0, δ(n)(
This shows that there is no deviating strategy that can result in the player gaining more than 1 q(n) in G n for n > max{n0, n1}.
CONCLUSIONS
We have shown that computing an -NE for an infinitelyrepeated game is indeed easier than computing one in a normal-form game. Our techniques use threats and punishment much in the same way that they are used to prove the Folk Theorem. However, there is a new twist to our results. We must assume that players are computationally bounded, and we use some cryptographic techniques that rely on standard cryptographic assumptions.
Our paper leaves many interesting open problems for future research:
• Our results are restricted to games with a fixed number of players. Can similar ideas be used when the number of players is part of the input?
• There are versions of the Folk Theorem that give subgame-perfect equilibria (see for example [8] ). Can we find such an equilibrium in polynomial time?
• Our result is based on cryptographic hardness assumptions. Are these assumptions a necessary condition for an efficient computation of a repeated game equilibrium? )). We can now describe a PPT D that distinguishes {Fn} n∈N and {Hn} n∈N for infinitely many n's. First notice that a PPT can easily simulate polynomially many oracle queries to both a truly random function and to a member of Fn. So D on input (1 n , X) randomly chooses j ∈ {1, . . . , q(n)} and calls D with input (1 n , (I 1 , . . . , I j−1 , X, J j+1 , . . . , J q(n) )), where it simulates a query to I k as a query to a random member of Hn, and a query to J k as a query to a random member of Fn.
(Notice that since D is a PPT, it can make only polynomially many oracle queries to any of the functions, which can be easily simulated). Whenever D makes an oracle query to X, D makes an oracle query to X, and uses its answer as the answer to D. When D terminates, D outputs the same value as D. Now notice that if X is Hn, then the input to D is T j n , while if X is Fn, then the input to D is T ) ). But this means that for any such n, D can distinguish F = {Fn} n∈N and H = {Hn} n∈N with non-negligible probability, and thus can do that for infinitely many n's. This is a contradiction to the assumption that {fs : {0, 1} |s| → {0, 1} |s| } s∈{0,1} * is a pseudorandom function ensemble.
